


REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave Blank)		2. REPORT DATE  September 1991		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED  Final
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  The Security Environment in the Post-Cold War World: A Short-, Mid- and Long-Term Assessment				5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Ly Burnham      Rodney Katz      Andrea Savada Robert Garian      Amy Knight      Joshua Sinai Walter Iwaskiw      Helen Metz				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  Federal Research Division Library of Congress Washington, DC 20540-5220				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  United States Marine Corps Intelligence Center Quantico, VA 22134				10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  Prepared under an Interagency Agreement				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.				
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)  Interprets events unfolding in the post-Cold War era within the context of United States security concerns and military missions and extrapolates short-, mid- and long-term trends. More than seventy countries are subjects of research and analysis in this report.  <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">19951211 055</div>				
14. SUBJECT TERMS  Future analyses      Military missions Worldwide Cold-war, Post			15. NUMBER OF PAGES  54	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT  UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE  UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT  UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT  SAR	



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## THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD: A SHORT-, MID- AND LONG-TERM ASSESSMENT

*Latin America  
Asia-Pacific  
Middle East and Southwest Asia  
Africa*

September 1991

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
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Louis R. Mortimer

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## **Preface**

This study was prepared for the United States Marine Corps Intelligence Center, Research and Analysis Branch, Hochmuth Hall, Quantico, Virginia. It was prepared under an interagency agreement by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. For additional information on the fee-based research, analytical, and foreign-language services provided by the Library of Congress, please contact Louis R. Mortimer, Chief (202/245-5200), or Robert L. Worden, Marketing Coordinator (202/245-5209) [FAX number 202/245-5290], Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This study is intended to be the initial product in a series on the historic events unfolding in the rapidly changing post-Cold War era. Whenever possible, it interprets these events within the context of United States security concerns and Marine Corps missions and extrapolates short-, mid-, and long-term trends. More than seventy countries were the subjects of research and analysis in this preliminary report. In addition to the twelve principal authors, other Division and Library staff assisted in the preparation of this study. Marilyn Majeska read the manuscript and made valuable suggestions. Her skilled eye and careful reading added clarity and precision to the text. The look of the final product was greatly enhanced by the efforts of Donald Murphy and by the Library's Office of Photoduplication Services.

The study is the second trend analysis the Division has produced in 1991. Both offered everyone an opportunity to think creatively and project into the future. While this is a difficult task, it is nevertheless exciting and challenging. We have all learned and profited from the experience.

Finally, throughout the course of the project, we were grateful for the encouragement and support provided by Louis R. Mortimer, Chief of the Division.

David McClave, Editor  
September 1991

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## INTRODUCTION

Revolutionary changes that swept Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s will have repercussions well into the next century. In 1991 the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the fracturing of the Soviet Union have suddenly catapulted the United States into position as the world's only superpower. As the Soviet armed forces undergo radical restructuring, post World War II alliances designed to contain the spread of communism will find new missions or themselves be disbanded.

Out of former empires and large multinational countries, new nations will be born. In the past forty-five years, the number of United Nations (UN) members has more than tripled, from 50 to 166 (1991). Continuing this trend, the community of nations will increase dramatically in the forecast period (1991-2020). Centrifugal forces in Europe and Asia will spin off new countries from the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, from China, India, and Iraq. As a result, the number of national armed forces should multiply. As substantial amounts of cheap but advanced weapons become available from arms control treaties and cutbacks in Europe or come on the market from high-technology producers, the number of conflicts, especially low-intensity conflicts, will likely increase.

Although initially shunning the role, the United States in the forecast period may be compelled to become the world's policeman/security guard. As they were in the Gulf War, U.S. armed forces will be the nucleus of international coalitions to secure vital resources, enforce non-proliferation by seizing or destroying nuclear weapons sites/production facilities, fight illicit drug production and distribution, establish and maintain peace among fractious nationalities, or help prevent environmental degradation.

Oil will continue to be a critical source of energy for the developed world until well into the next century. As reserves are depleted elsewhere, the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries' (OPECs) share of global proved reserves will double from approximately 20 percent to 40 percent, and OPEC stocks will become the world's de facto strategic petroleum reserve. Pre-positioned U.S. military equipment and even military forces will be deployed in the Middle East for this mission and in order to put regional tyrants in their place.

Some predict that the twenty-first century will be the century of the Pacific. Despite the impending departure of U.S. armed forces from the Philippines and the loss of two key bases there, throughout the forecast period the United States will maintain a



military presence in the Pacific. In addition to its responsibility to protect the welfare and security of its own territories, the United States will ensure the stability of traditional allies and the openness and accessibility of vital trade routes.

The twenty-first century will not be the Century of Africa. In 1991 it is the world's poorest inhabited continent. Most sub-Saharan countries will be hard pressed to achieve early twentieth century living standards. Little progress will be made in closing the gap between rich and poor nations. On the contrary, it is likely that the many underdeveloped countries of Africa and Asia will receive less assistance from the developed world, as funds and expertise are redirected to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

An old sage once noted that the best crystal ball is a large rear view mirror. Although our rear view mirror for this study was not very large, in this first brief look we nonetheless saw the vague shape of some things to come. The large strategic nuclear forces of the triad should diminish in importance. Under the best case scenario, they will be abolished. Instead, weapons will be smaller, faster, and stealthier. In the coming decades, a thriving high-technology weapons mart may put miniaturized antiaircraft missiles in the hands of terrorists as easily as a VCR is obtained today. Over the next thirty years, a Cold-War size U.S. military will not be required. Instead, smaller, faster, more flexible, high-technology rapid deployment forces will be emphasized. In the forecast period, as the nation's primary maritime expeditionary force, the Marines should be prepared to perform their traditional military tasks (invasionary forces; training allied forces). But they also should expect new and challenging assignments such as drug interdiction, disaster relief, and environmental repair and restoration work.

## **KEY JUDGMENTS**

### **LATIN AMERICA**

- Narcotics trafficking from and through Latin America, combined with political instability in some countries, a major threat to U.S. security.
- Economic and social factors likely to persist in causing major political instability in selected Latin American countries in the next three decades.
- Geographic, demographic, and environmental factors reduce ability of Latin American countries to deal with effects of the natural disasters to which the region is prone.
- Presence of nuclear technology and major arms manufacture in Brazil and Argentina creates possibility of terrorist action posing potential strategic threat.

### **ASIA-PACIFIC**

- U.S. forces withdrawn from the Philippines. Other U.S. possessions used as bases.
- Former foes becoming friends: Korea and Japan, United States and Vietnam, Vietnam and China. Former friendships under tension: United States and Philippines and United States and Japan. Possible India-Pakistan and Spratly Islands wars.
- Reunification of Korean Peninsula and confederation of China and Taiwan probable. Possible emergence of Japan as military power in Pacific.


### **MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHWEST ASIA**

- Formation of new political and security alliances in short- and mid-terms with United States in major role.
- New Middle Eastern nations emerge in mid-term, including Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Western Sahara, Kurdistan in northern Iraq and a Shia state in Southern Iraq.
- Monarchies transformed into military or Islamic democratic republics in mid- and long-terms.
- Severe water shortages in mid- and long-term, resulting in conflicts over water.

### **AFRICA**

- Sub-Saharan Africa experiences severe economic and political developmental problems. Nations continue to be divided by tribal and ethnic conflicts.
- Nonracial democracy in post-apartheid South Africa. Questions over new majority black government's role in nuclear sphere.
- United States in election monitoring, peace-keeping, evacuation, and disaster relief roles.
- Food shortages, famine, overpopulation, droughts, and deforestation widespread in forecast period. AIDS and other infectious fatal diseases rampant.

# Latin America



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## THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE POST COLD-WAR WORLD: LATIN AMERICA

### INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, Latin America has been alternately emphasized and neglected in U.S. policy, depending mainly on the prominence of issues involving individual countries in the region. For a number of reasons, including geographical proximity and the end of the European-centered Cold War, the next decades might bring reemphasis on Latin American policy. If that reemphasis is crisis-driven, and especially if U.S. interests in Central America require protection, the U.S. military might play a primary or support role. This section outlines four major Latin American issues and the potential involvement of the U.S. military in addressing them.

### NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING

In 1991 U.S. public opinion continued to view drug trafficking as a priority issue in U.S.-Latin American relations. The main reasons for the public's concern were continued easy availability of cocaine and crack cocaine and accompanying increases in violent crime and drug-related corruption in the United States. In the late 1980s, official anti-drug campaigns heightened public awareness of the problem and its connection to Latin American policy. In 1990 virtually all the cocaine entering the United States came from three countries: Columbia, Peru, and Bolivia. The following tables show recent coca production in those countries.

**Table 1. COCA CULTIVATION AND NET PRODUCTION**

COCA CULTIVATION, 1990 (in hectares)			
Country	Cultivated	Eradicated	Net
Bolivia	58,400	8,100	50,300
Colombia	41,000	900	40,100
Peru	121,300	0	121,300

COCA NET PRODUCTION, 1988-1991 (in metric tons)				
Country	1991 (est.)	1990	1989	1988
Bolivia	56,500	64,400	68,300	58,500
Colombia	31,000	32,100	33,900	27,200
Peru	138,300	138,300	137,300	125,900

Source: U.S. Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 1991, pp. 21-22.

U.S. policy split resources between two goals: curtailing demand and cutting off supply. In 1989 the latter goal was incorporated into the Andean Strategy, a five-year plan to spend \$2.2 billion to aid the governments of the three countries in disrupting the growing, processing, and transport of coca (base material for cocaine) and its products. The strategy calls for augmenting military, economic, and law enforcement resources in those countries. Other Latin American countries are also involved in drug trafficking in various ways: Mexico, a major producer of heroin and marijuana and an entry route for cocaine into the United States; Panama and Guatemala, identified as major transit countries; Brazil, Ecuador, and Chile, into which coca production is moving when forced out of existing enclaves (Brazil is also a transshipment country and source of processing chemicals); and Cuba, located amid major transshipment routes to the United States and operating under an unknown interdiction policy conditioned by its geopolitical position. In mid-1991, the U.S. strategy of bilateral agreements and international conventions had reduced coca production only minimally because of economic and political conditions in producer countries and the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms.

The background situation includes several factors that may drive future military roles in the U.S. anti-drug strategy. First, economic conditions in producer countries will determine whether coca production continues to support significant parts of the rural populations; two important questions here are the success of crop replacement strategies and the flexibility of agricultural policy by Latin American governments. Second, the broad condition of politics (the integrity of the military and judiciary as well as the health of the electoral process) in those countries will determine the practicality and efficacy of bilateral agreements with the United States and the influence of Latin American governments on drug activities. Third, future U.S. public awareness of drugs as a primary social problem will determine resource availability for counter-narcotics activities, and public beliefs about the efficacy of supply strategy versus demand strategy will determine proportional distribution of available resources, including the military. Fourth, willingness and availability of the military for advisory or interdiction activities will determine directly the scope of military involvement in the next thirty years. Although military availability will depend on the existence of competing conventional requirements (a military crisis elsewhere in the world, for example), future policy will depend on the outcome of debate on the military's proper role. Proponents of military deployment argue that drug trafficking is a threat to

national security that only the military is equipped to oppose; opponents say that drug enforcement is an unconventional role for which the military is not equipped, that such an undertaking would detract from conventional readiness, and that use of the U.S. military in Latin America is diplomatically unsound.

Examples of long-term future scenarios for a military role might involve Peru, Cuba, or Panama. Peru, whose highly unstable economic and political climate has prevented effective counter-narcotics strategy, has already permitted small-scale U.S. military training of anti-narcotics forces on-site, despite encountering substantial opposition from peasant groups. Given a continuation of present corruption in the Peruvian military and ineffectiveness in the judiciary, a long-term U.S. training role might be the best hope for developing a reliable indigenous counter-narcotics cadre--assuming that a succession of Peruvian governments is able to maintain such an "imperialist" policy. The Cuban scenario would take place in a post-Castro era, in the event that a series of weak governments came under the influence of drug traders and allowed a substantial increase in traffic into the United States, establishing a distribution outpost closer to U.S. territory than any previous outpost. Should the U.S. threat perception from such an outpost reach a certain point, direct military intervention might result. The third scenario relates to Panama. That country, which has unique strategic importance for the United States, is attempting to improve a previously poor record of narcotics control, with the help of a bilateral agreement with the United States. Thus far the record is uneven, but Panama's proximity to Colombia means that a weak or corrupt Panamanian government would invite increased narcotics traffic that might constitute a major security issue for the United States. Given the precedent of Operation "Just Cause," such a situation might bring further U.S. military involvement in Panama.

Conceivable anti-narcotics military activity by the United States in Latin America would thus take two forms: a training mission, extending the small-scale assistance programs already attempted; and a mission of active intervention, aimed at directly eradicating drug activity deemed a special threat to U.S. security.

#### **POLITICAL TRENDS AND POTENTIAL SOURCES OF INSTABILITY**

Latin American societies are now much less tradition-oriented and much more complex, mobilized, and dynamic than previously. Social, political, and economic change is accelerating and penetrating deeply into society in most nations. There is a growing

differentiation among social and political groups, hence greater pluralism and societal fragmentation. Throughout the region, competing labor and peasant movements are challenging the wealth and political position of traditional elites. With the old order declining, most countries will continue to experience a difficult transition to democracy. Conflict over the direction of national policies will persist, and the younger generation will reject moderate solutions in favor of more radical programs. Socialism will continue to be viewed as a viable economic and political alternative, despite the failure of the Soviet version of the system. The influence of the United States as a political and economic model will likely continue to decline. Nonetheless, as a signatory of the 1947 Rio Pact, a collective security agreement among Western Hemisphere nations, and as a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), which guarantees the territorial integrity and security of all member states, the United States might be called upon to intervene militarily in certain situations. Economic deterioration in many countries will likely combine with spiraling population growth to exacerbate politically unstable situations--some, such as that in Peru, foreseeable for many years, others perhaps developing quickly after a stable government has left office.

In countries such as Venezuela and Costa Rica, a commitment to democracy likely will remain firm. In the past decade, dictatorships have ended in Paraguay, Chile, Panama, and Nicaragua, and those countries are trying to establish a viable democratic tradition. But in some cases, a long-term balance between leftist extremism and military authoritarianism may be impossible if extremists from one of those sides are able to exploit the dissatisfaction bred by weak economies. Cuba is a special case whose immediate future may depend on a new relationship with the Soviet Union and whose long-term future will depend on what political structure follows the Castro regime. It is expected that withdrawal of Soviet aid and the discrediting of world communism will eventually bring radical political and economic changes to Cuba, and that Cuba will be drawn back into the Latin American community of nations. But the transition process could bring extreme political instability.

Military repression, the absence of channels for legitimate political expression, and economic backwardness are the primary roots of terrorism and insurgency. Because these roots are likely to persist for the foreseeable future, terrorism will likely continue to threaten political stability in Latin America. For some time, Peru has faced the most

formidable terrorist movement in the region, and no improvement seems imminent. The leading terrorist group, the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) is a heavily armed Maoist organization that has caused \$19 billion dollars of damage and 20,000 deaths in the last decade. U.S. government installations have been a target of the group during that time. Terrorist groups have also been active in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Panama, and Guatemala. In Colombia, where terrorist kidnappings have averaged 1,000 per year, the Army of National Liberation group planned a major sabotage attack on an oil pipeline but was thwarted.

In the 1980s, growing numbers of terrorist and insurgency groups traded drugs such as cocaine for weapons. This exchange has occurred frequently along the Costa Rican-Panamanian border, for example. Columbia, considered the "superstate of narco-terrorism," has been fertile ground for such activity for many years. Although Cuba's new geopolitical situation may well decrease its support for terrorism in Colombia, that event would not by itself stem the terrorist tide. Narco-terrorism is also spreading rapidly to countries such as Peru and Bolivia. Should government institutions in a country such as Colombia come under substantial control of the narcotics underworld or insurgents with a different agenda, corruption and violence could reach a level that would threaten U.S. security interests and call for intervention.

Changes in military technology may well favor guerrilla warfare to further political goals in Latin America. Rapid improvement of small, lightweight weaponry and munitions would increase the advantage of terrorists and insurgents over regular police and military forces. It is these groups that U.S. forces might be required to engage in combat if the conditions described here were to threaten U.S. security. Low-intensity conflict (LIC) is identified as the most likely form of combat in the Latin American arena in future decades. In spite of reluctance to renew the U.S. image as an interventionist, the United States might find it difficult to avoid being drawn into a major low-intensity conflict on the territory of a Latin American ally of strategic significance (such as Guatemala) or one with a clear commitment to democracy (such as Costa Rica). Probability of such involvement will be driven in the next decades by the success of experimental democracy in countries such as Panama, El Salvador, and Nicaragua; the duration of periods of economic and political cohesion in key countries such as Brazil and Mexico; and the relative importance of Latin American issues such as narcotics trafficking in U.S. foreign policy.



## **NATURAL DISASTER VULNERABILITIES AND REFUGEE PROBLEMS**

Latin America is vulnerable to a variety of natural and man-made disasters: earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, floods, epidemics, and the impact of environmental degradation. Among the most recent catastrophic events were the 1985 Mexico City earthquake and the 1989 yellow fever epidemic in Bolivia. The gravity of such events (hence the need for outside assistance should they occur) is closely linked to the existing political, economic, and environmental conditions of the area.

Flooding is the most frequent disaster in Latin America. The severity and frequency of floods depend on geographical location and environmental characteristics. Extent of flood damage is linked to settlement patterns, economic activity, and infrastructure development. Because most Latin American countries lack adequate public facilities and have large migrant populations, flooding is a major health problem. For example, a 1988 flood in Rio de Janeiro caused an outbreak of infectious disease in the poor areas of the city, and the same flood brought malaria and typhoid to the western Amazonian state of Acre. Destruction of watershed vegetation will increase the severity of flooding in the Amazon Basin and elsewhere in Latin America, with economic, social, and political repercussions. (Although the Amazon rain forest is the largest and most publicized example of large-scale environmental disruption, current destruction of Central American rain forests carries the same potential for exacerbating the effects of floods and storms in populated areas.)

Countries located along the circum-Pacific earthquake belt, especially Peru, Chile, Ecuador, and Colombia, are highly susceptible to earthquakes. Mexico, Central America, and Caribbean nations are also in prime seismic zones. Increased frequency of earthquakes in northern Chile is a cause for concern. In 1985 quakes in Mexico and Chile caused severe damage and loss of life. The 1983 Costa Rica quake cut off towns and cut the Pan American Highway. In countries with weak political and economic systems, the panic and devastation of a major quake event can lead to chaos.

Hurricanes are the most frequent disaster in the Caribbean and Central America, located in a major hurricane zone. In storm season, coastal areas are hit with floods; in 1988, hurricane Gilbert caused severe damage throughout the Caribbean, with Jamaica the hardest hit. Infrastructure and economic damage was estimated at \$1 billion; 60 percent of low-income housing was destroyed and 80 percent of health centers put out of

operation. This was an especially devastating blow in a country with severely limited resources.

The Amazon Basin, which contains 30 to 40 percent of the world's rain forest, is being deforested at a rate of 5,000 square miles per year. Besides the long-term greenhouse effects projected from deforestation, there is growing awareness of more immediate impacts and the need for urgent action. But because the countries concerned have enormous social and economic problems, most cannot undertake large-scale conservation measures. Brazil, the prime example, has a huge external debt, inadequate public services, a high rate of population growth, and disproportionate allocation of national income. The current vigorous environmental program of President Collor requires large amounts of technical and financial assistance. On the other hand, failure to carry out the program is certain to increase Brazil's vulnerability to disasters, including floods and epidemics.

Regional conflicts have also caused significant refugee movements that are potentially destabilizing and would place added stress on a country during a natural disaster. For example, Costa Rica now has an estimated 250,000 illegal immigrants who fled political and military hostilities in other Central American countries. Tension between refugees and indigenous communities are often high, and added stress falls on the national economy. Given a natural disaster scenario, a major internal disturbance could result.

Under these circumstances, several roles are possible for the U.S. military. As has already occurred in several cases, on-site natural disaster relief is a useful role that improves relations with Latin America. If environmental issues continue moving to world attention, the U.S. military might be cast in a new role, that of assisting local authorities in reforestation, land reclamation, construction of water transport systems, or other large-scale projects requiring both technical expertise and manpower. And a major refugee movement such as that into Costa Rica might at some point require U.S. assistance or training in border patrol activities.

#### **ARMS PROLIFERATION AND THE NUCLEAR ISSUE**

In Latin America, as in other parts of the Third World, there is a correlation between defense industrialization and nuclear arms proliferation. Producers of sophisticated conventional weapons, such as Brazil and Argentina, are most likely to be engaged in research and development of nuclear arms. And conventional weapons, especially missiles,

can be delivery systems for nuclear, biological, and chemical warheads. Production of ballistic missiles also confers new political and military stature; Brazil and Argentina have and continue to develop sophisticated missile systems programs. Argentina's Condor II, with a 500-600 mile range, will be able to reach the Falkland Islands. Brazil has six ballistic missiles under development, including the Avibras SS-1000, whose range is 740 miles.


In the mid-1980s, Brazil was listed among the world's sixteen largest arms exporters. Brazil exports military equipment and technology to Europe and the Middle East; it is building a trainer aircraft for the British Royal Air Force and under license to an Arab firm for the Egyptian and Iraqi armed forces. Domestic weapons manufacture is also enabling both Brazil and Argentina to reduce weapons imports. Those countries are now able to design and produce major conventional weapons, small arms, and ammunition independently. Total Latin American arms imports decreased 7 percent between 1978 and 1988.

The long-time rivalry between Brazil and Argentina has stimulated their development of nuclear technology. Both have major nuclear power generation facilities that are inherently dual-purpose. Both have advanced nuclear research projects and considerable military involvement in the nuclear power industry. According to a 1991 report, 'by the year 2000 both will be capable of producing nuclear weapons if their geopolitical situation called for them. Argentina is believed to have plutonium extraction capability, and Brazil has advanced experimental plutonium enrichment facilities. Despite these circumstances, however, neither country (nor any other in Latin America) currently has reason to fear the military intentions of a neighbor. There are relatively few active territorial disputes; the only country with motivation to strengthen its international image by moving toward nuclear weapons is Argentina, whose negotiations with Britain over the Falklands still are unresolved.

In November 1990, Argentina and Brazil signed a joint declaration for joint accounting and control of all nuclear activities according to the standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The two countries were then to ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty, which in 1967 called for prohibition of acquiring, producing, or stationing nuclear weapons in Latin America. (The treaty does allow acquisition and use of peaceful nuclear explosives, provided that they are not convertible to military use.) Among

the few Latin American states who have yet to sign the treaty is Cuba, which in 1991 was building a Soviet-type nuclear power plant and may still have Soviet nuclear missiles on its territory. Meanwhile, several Latin American countries, including Brazil and Argentina, have refused to sign the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty because they felt the treaty was imposed upon them by the two nuclear superpowers. For most Latin American states, Tlatelolco is the defining document on nuclear policy. U.S. agreements for nuclear energy cooperation with Argentina and Brazil through this century have been inactive because they refuse international inspection of nuclear facilities. A special concern is export of nuclear technology and equipment, which has included deals with Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt and could impair the national security of the United States or a U.S. ally.

There is little likelihood of a short-term scenario for U.S. military activity stimulated by conventional or nuclear arms production or export in Latin America. The plutonium and sophisticated nuclear technology present in two Latin American countries, however, could be a terrorist target within the next three decades. Because of the proximity of Latin America and the likelihood that nuclear arms proliferation will advance as an international issue during that span, a threat to Brazilian or Argentine nuclear facilities might activate a U.S. military response to prevent an episode of nuclear blackmail.



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Figure 2. Southern Asia, 1990

## **THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE POST COLD-WAR WORLD: ASIA-PACIFIC**

### **INTRODUCTION**

By mid-1991, the end of the Cold War had already initiated significant changes in the political and economic landscape and seascape of Asia and the Pacific. As elsewhere, former client states of the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc countries have been suddenly left to their own meager devices. Ill-equipped and ill-prepared for the New World (and Asian) Order and isolated from rising prosperity in many Pacific rim countries, North Korea and Vietnam are exploring paths to accommodation and cooperation in place of Cold War enmity.

In the short-term, this new spirit of cooperation will manifest itself in the resolution of a range of contentious issues: the conflict in Cambodia, return of the Kurile Islands to Japan, friendlier relations between North Korea and South Korea, resolution of the MIA/POW issue, and restoration of U.S.-Vietnamese relations.

In the mid- to long-term, the following events are expected to take place in Asia: the reunification of the Korean Peninsula; a Taiwanese-Chinese condominium; the end of the U.S. military presence in the Philippines; several new nation-states formed from former Soviet Central Asia, China, India and Pacific Island territories; a possible war over the Spratly Islands; the emergence of a Japanese military commensurate with its economic power; and mounting tension among Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

### **GEOPOLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND ALLIANCES**

Based on recent events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and a declining Soviet threat, the relative stability of Northeast Asia is nevertheless expected to undergo new perturbations. In the past, actual and potential areas of conflict for Northeast Asia have included the Sino-Soviet border, the Korean Peninsula, the strategic straits of Japan, the Kurile Islands, and the sea lanes of the western Pacific.

In Asia and the Pacific as in Europe, free market economies are in a growth cycle, and centrally planned economies are in decline. In the short- and mid-term, relations between Russia and China and Japan should improve following the resolution of territorial disputes.

In the short-term, China will remain a large isolated node wishing to join the free market (capitalist) network without undertaking political reforms. In the post-Deng era, it is likely to loosen controls on its economy and society. In addition to the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese border problem, conflict scenarios for China include ethnic conflicts in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia; and disputes over the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku Islands and Taiwan. These conflicts will remain even though China and Taiwan have, in principle, agreed to an eventual reunification, which is expected to occur in the mid- or long-term. In this same period, Tibet is expected to gain its independence, and Xinjiang is expected to establish an independent Eastern Turkistan Republic.

The end of the Cold War will have a profound impact on the Korean Peninsula, which should be reunified in the mid-term or long-term. Setting aside decades of obstructionism, in 1991 North Korea and South Korea finally approved separate admission to the United Nations. Such changes will impact on U.S. security policies and military missions and deployment. For decades the United States has provided the bulk of South Korea's economic and military aid. By 1991, South Korea had become a thriving economic power, and some economic forecasts predict its economy will double by 1996.

In contrast, North Korea has stagnated. Largely dependent on aid from the Soviet Union and China, it is poorly positioned to cope with the task of modernization. The government in Pyongyang maintains the sixth largest standing army at great economic and social cost: 25 percent of its \$23 billion gross national product (GNP). Driven by economic woes and by the hope of obtaining aid, North Korea has explored the normalization of its relations with traditional foe, Japan, and also has sought improved relations with the United States and Europe. Seoul, too, has sought to repair relations with traditional adversaries through diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union and by expanded trade with China.

The United States spends approximately \$2.5 billion annually maintaining 45,000 troops in South Korea--a contentious issue in the United States. South Korea has agreed to defray just \$320 million of these costs per year. Owing to a perceived reduction in tensions, in 1991 South Korean defense expenditures were reduced below 4 percent of GNP for the first time in 18 years.

In accordance with the Nunn-Warner Bill, the United States will withdraw 7,000 troops by 1992, with more cuts to follow. By the year 2000, the 28,000-strong 2nd

Infantry Division will have departed, leaving behind only several U.S. Air Force squadrons. South Korea cannot replace key offshore forces, which would have a potentially decisive impact in a war with North Korea.

Political stability in South Korea is impaired by the unrest caused by slow democratization. Further, growing anti-Americanism among the 1.2 million South Korean students, one of the largest student populations in the world, is linked to the U.S. traditional support for Seoul's succession of authoritarian regimes.

In the short-term, there is great potential for unrest in both North Korea and South Korea. Food and energy shortages and the end of Kim Il Sung's long and repressive regime in North Korea, and severe pollution and mass discontent in the South Korea will continue to be short-term destabilizing factors.

For the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN--Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand), the consequences of the Cold War's end usher in a period of uncertainty. The poorer nations of the association (Indonesia and the Philippines) fear that essential foreign aid from the developed world may be re-routed to assist Eastern Europe and the (former) Soviet Union. The wealthier, export-oriented countries (Brunei, Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia) will capitalize on emerging markets and trade opportunities in Eastern Europe.

In the near term, the U.S. and Soviet military presence and power projection in the Pacific will decline. From a United States perspective, the greatest impact on Pacific security will arise from the imminent departure of U.S. forces from the Philippines. Even though prospects are encouraging for greater access to facilities in Singapore and Malaysia, the loss of Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base ends a powerful, nearly century-long U.S. military presence on the archipelago.

Still unresolved are contentious territorial claims involving various Southeast Asian countries. Specifically, the Philippines contests Malaysian control of Sabah (formerly North Borneo), and the same two countries, plus China, Taiwan, Brunei, and Vietnam all, lay claim to the possibly oil-rich Spratly Islands.

In the medium-term, a diminished superpower military profile in the Pacific may be compensated for by an enhanced Japanese or Chinese military presence. This development will cause more than mild anxiety in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore--countries with painful memories of Japanese occupation in World War II.



Nevertheless, U.S.-Philippine ties are multifaceted and long-standing. Even without the military presence, U.S. economic and diplomatic interests will remain strong at least for the medium-term and possibly for the entire forecast period. If the fragile democracy in the Philippines totters and the lives of U.S. citizens are threatened, U.S. military intervention could be used to restore stability.

Additional island communities can be expected to gain their independence in the forecast period. One of the new nations will be the Republic of Palau as U.S. trusteeship over the Trust of the Pacific Islands (Palau) will end in the short- or medium-term.

#### **MILITARY-POLITICAL PROBLEMS**

A number of political disputes will continue to influence the security perceptions of each of the South Asian nations in the forecast period and could hamper regional and international efforts to defuse existing and future crises in the region. The separatist movement in the Kashmir region of India's state of Jammu is the most likely political problem to precipitate this scenario.

Pakistan's border with Afghanistan will remain unstable long after the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) leaves the political scene. Pakistan has been the international conduit for most of the military and humanitarian aid provided to millions of Afghan refugees and several mujahidiin organizations, the mainstay of the resistance to communist rule.

The demise of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the rise of nationalism in Soviet Central Asia is bound to affect new political alliances in Afghanistan. For example, Afghan Uzbeks may migrate to or even be incorporated into an independent Uzbek state.

Bangladesh generally has maintained friendly relations with India since it obtained its independence from Pakistan in 1971. However, India's size and occasional cross-border military intrusions have caused Dhaka to label New Delhi a potential adversary. Although an Indian attack on Bangladesh is unlikely, Dhaka's limited military capability to protect its 2,000-kilometer border would require it to seek assistance from the United Nations, or possibly from another nation opposed to the expansion of India's influence in the region.

The following crisis development scenarios are conceivable in South Asia over the next thirty years:

### India and Pakistan

(1991-1995) Both countries produce a limited number of nuclear weapons, but claim they will use them only for defensive purposes. A low-intensity conflict continues in Kashmir, with Pakistan providing military assistance to Muslim insurgents seeking independence from India. (1996-2005) India and Pakistan go to war over Kashmir. International intervention prevents the war from escalating into a general war. (2006-2020) International arbitration leads to bilateral agreements between India and Pakistan that include recognition of an independent Kashmir and mutual reductions in the armed forces of both countries.

### Afghanistan

(1991-1995) Moscow's democratically elected leaders cut off military and economic assistance to Afghanistan. Mujahideen forces gradually win control of the country. Low-intensity conflict continues in a new Islamic state because of political disagreements among various religious, ethnic, and regional groups. (1996-2005) International arbitration results in political compromises among Afghanistan's conflicting groups. The northern Balkh and Samangan provinces become part of the newly proclaimed Islamic Republic of Uzbekistan.

(2006-2020) International arbitration leads to agreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan that include recognition of an independent Baluchistan and mutual reductions in the size of the armed forces along new international borders.

### Bangladesh

(1991-2020) Bangladesh steadily improves its standing in the international community. India and Bangladesh negotiate a border agreement. New Delhi and Dhaka gradually improve their relations.

### Sri Lanka

(1991-1995) Militant Tamil leaders retain control of the northern districts of the country. Civil war continues and includes small-scale conventional battles, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism. (1996-2005) Tamil leaders fail in their effort to win international recognition for an independent state. An international arms embargo reduces but fails to destroy the Tamil Liberation Army. (2006-2020) Exodus of Tamils from Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese-dominated government in Colombo gradually regains control of the northern districts, and Tamil resistance flags with isolated terrorist attacks.

## OTHER SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ISSUES

Many local communities of South Asian countries have little contact with the national government and do not identify with it. Sikhism is the primary religion in the Punjab province of India, and many Sikhs fiercely oppose Hindus and Muslims living in Punjab. Separatist feelings run strong in the province, and terrorism and assassination are traditional means of opposition. Indian residents in Pakistan's Sind province who arrived in 1947 have never been accepted by indigenous Sindhis, and violence is common. Chakma (Buddhist) tribes in the Chittagong Hills are opposed to the Bangladesh government's efforts to assimilate them into the mainstream of that Islamic nation. Secular, Sunni Muslim, and Shi'a Muslim groups from various regions of Afghanistan cannot agree on how the government should be organized in the future.

Most countries of southern Asia and mainland southeast Asia struggle with illiteracy, poverty, high rates of population growth, and the delivery of basic services. Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia have been ravaged by wars and economic problems. Thailand has had the additional burden of thousands of refugees from Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

Unless steps are taken to stabilize the economies and accommodate democratic movements, by 1996 social and economic unrest will erupt in the region, especially in Burma and Vietnam (presently under military and communist rule, respectively).

Beside the unsettled situation in Cambodia, mainland Southeast Asia faces two potentially explosive issues: Burma and the Spratly Islands. Burma portends trouble before 1996 because of its political instability and its potential chemical weapons capability. The Spratly Islands are claimed by six countries: Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.

In the next thirty years, U.S. activities in mainland southeast Asia will primarily involve providing humanitarian assistance, support to counter narcotics operations, and peacekeeping operations (possibly in Cambodia). If the Spratly Islands become a conflict, the United States could be involved in a combined international military intervention to keep the vital Malacca Straits open for international shipping.

### Burma

Since its independence in 1948, Burma has gone through several changes of leadership and forms of government--democracy to one-party rule to military rule and

continually has had to face political turmoil and internal conflict with communist groups and ethnic minorities. Ineptitude in government and the drain of its resources in dealing with these conflicts have devastated Burma's national economy.

When demonstrators took to the streets in 1988 to demand the return of democracy, the military brutally crushed them, formed the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), and changed the country's name to Myanmar. Since 1988, the military government has tried to revive the economy by inviting foreign investments. However, its priority on defense building to ensure political controls and to curb ethnic insurgency has left a vacuum in other vital areas, e.g., drug control and the fostering of improvement in social services.

On May 27, 1990, general elections were held. To the dismay of the SLORC, the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), won by a landslide. The SLORC refused to step down and put Aung San Suu Kyi, the winner, under house arrest. The NLD will probably reemerge within the decade with the support of some factions of the military. However if the economy has not recovered within the next decade, social unrest will erupt and demand for democratic pluralism will intensify.

For decades, Burma has had to deal with communist insurgencies and ethnic conflicts. The three most persistent of Burma's ethnic insurgent groups are the Kachins in the north, who finance their struggle and obtain Chinese arms from jade and opium sales; the Shan and the communists in central Burma; and the Karen to the south, who sustain their forces mostly through payments from smugglers across the Burmese-Thai border.

#### Cambodia

The peaceful settlement of the war in Cambodia is in its final stage. The four warring factions have settled most of their differences with the active support of China and Vietnam. They are expected to complete and sign a comprehensive political settlement at a Paris peace conference in late October 1991. While welcoming the end of 12 years of conflict that ravaged their country, the people of Cambodia are wary of the return of the Khmer Rouge in any form. Cambodia's problems will not end with the peace accord.

#### Spratly Islands

With a seabed reportedly rich in oil and gas, the Spratly Islands, astride the South China Sea's fishing grounds and shipping lanes, are strategically located near the major international sealanes linking Japan and other Northeast Asian oil-dependent nations. China

claims almost all of the South China Sea up to the maritime boundaries of the five other claimants (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam). Except for Brunei, all claimants have stationed troops on the islands that are closest to their own territory.

### **TERRORISM**

In Japan, the once powerful leftist radical student movement has splintered into several warring factions. The largest leftist radical group, the Chukakuha, has approximately 5,000 members and has targeted government buildings and officials. A small (25 members) but dangerous terrorist group is the Japanese Red Army. Right-wing extremists are more numerous and have 120,000 members in 980 groups. In recent years the ruling Liberal Democratic Party has been beset by charges of corruption and forced resignations, but continues to enjoy a secure hold on power.

In the short-term, Japan faces the prospect of terrorism from the left. Attacks may be carried out in Europe, at sea, or in Japan in an attempt to seize or destroy nuclear materials en route to the Rokkasho plant. In the mid-term, Japan will be forced to increase the size and expand the role of the Self-Defense Forces and will contribute even more heavily to financing the U.S. military presence in the area. The result could be dissension in the government and clashes between left and right extremist groups.

### **COMMUNIST INSURGENCY AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS**

The perpetuation of intraregional conflicts and communal problems in each of the South Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka) means that terrorism will remain a serious concern throughout the forecast period. India, the state with the most stable political institutions in the region, reported at least 10,000 terrorist-related deaths in 1990. Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan together probably had at least the same number of casualties. Terrorism appears to be less prevalent in Bangladesh.

In order to deal with indigenous terrorist groups in the future, democratic political parties will have to broaden their constituencies to include rural and urban areas that traditionally have supported one or more terrorist groups. Regional organizations such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) will have to be strengthened to prevent terrorists from moving across international borders and taking sanctuary in remote, unpopulated areas.

In Sri Lanka, a conflict that originated as a small-scale terrorist movement by Tamil militants opposed to Sri Lanka's Sinhalese-dominated political establishment has become

increasingly violent. The level of distrust between Sri Lanka's Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority has deepened, and it is probable that a protracted civil war will continue.

In the Philippines, two groups of insurgents-- communists and radical Muslims-- wage war and conduct urban terrorism against the government, foreign nationals, and U.S. military personnel. On the surface, anti-American feelings seem to be intensifying, and it seems certain that major U.S. military facilities and personnel will be evicted soon.

#### **ARMS TRADE AND ARMS PROLIFERATION**

Three South Asian countries--India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan--are among the largest arms importers in the developing world. India, however, is the only South Asian country likely to become a major arms exporter during the next thirty years. In 1991, Moscow was still the major supplier of weapons imported by India and Afghanistan, and Beijing was the largest supplier of arms to Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. As arms control agreements take effect and Soviet industry converts to civilian production, the availability of Soviet weapons will be reduced drastically. Pakistan manufactures some Chinese-designed weapons, but Beijing is unlikely to approve third-country sales by Islamabad in the foreseeable future. Further, Pakistan views China as its most dependable arms supplier and is unlikely to jeopardize this relationship by initiating covert arms sales to other developing countries. Over the next thirty years, each of the South Asian countries will endeavor to diversify and modernize their armed forces. However, none of the South Asian countries appeared likely to enter into a regional or international military alliance in the near term.

India and Pakistan are engaged in a dangerous arms race that could cause a minor border incident to escalate into a full-scale war. Both countries have ongoing programs for developing nuclear weapons. In a worst case scenario, the capability of either country's armed forces to deploy nuclear missiles, aircraft, and artillery could endanger millions of South Asians and sabotage United States and international efforts to control nuclear arms proliferation.

Some sources indicate that North Korea could have a nuclear weapon in the 1990s--a matter of concern not only to South Korea but also to Japan, the United States, China, and the Soviet Union. A pre-emptive strike on the Yong Byon research reactor near Pyongyang may be called for, unless North Korea agrees to inspections by the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). North Korea was expected to sign an IAEA safeguards agreement, but as of mid-September 1991 had not done so.

In contrast to positions taken in Oceania (Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Island countries), ASEAN nations have not voiced strong opposition to nuclear weapons or attempted to restrict their movement in naval vessels. Such restrictions by New Zealand have caused the United States to refuse to sign protocols to a treaty declaring the South Pacific a "nuclear free zone" and have damaged the ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States) alliance. However, as the Soviet threat wanes, the United States and its navy will lose the justification for bearing such weapons. This trend may force a reconsideration of the Navy's policy of nuclear non-disclosure.

Although ASEAN nations have substantial military forces, no country in the Association has shown interest in acquiring nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.

#### **MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS**

India is the only nation in South Asia with prospects for developing space technologies for military purposes. One of India's aerospace projects is to design and build a space vehicle more advanced than the U.S. shuttle. Several types of potentially dual-use satellite launch vehicles are being produced in India. New Delhi probably will have accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying small nuclear warheads by 2005 and its own network of military-intelligence satellites by 2020. In the medium- or long-term, China and Japan may pool their relative advantages and develop dual-use space programs.

#### **ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS**

Economic power should displace military power as the major change driver in this region. And in this arena, Japan is the most exceptional among Asian countries. Since its surrender to Allied Forces in 1945, it has rebuilt its industrial infrastructure and become a world leader in many high-technology products, including consumer electronics, cameras, and watches. In addition, the Japanese steel industry is superior to Europe's steel industry.

In the postwar period, the economies of the ASEAN countries have consistently registered impressive growth rates. Singapore is an economic and military power, and the relative economic and military strength of Indonesia and Malaysia will increase in the forecast period.

With the exception of the Philippines, the economic outlook for Southeast Asian countries appears bright. Overall, the ASEAN countries are well endowed with natural resources. For example, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei have substantial reserves of oil and gas, and Singapore is a major refiner of these products.

### **NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING**

Drug abuse is on the increase in Asia, and the problem will worsen until governments develop effective counternarcotics programs targeting producers, traffickers, and users. In Turkey and India, opium is legally produced. Despite governmental prohibition against opium production, thousands of Afghan and Pakistani farmers grow opium as their primary cash crop. Marijuana production and use also is known to be increasing in the region. Cocaine and other illegal narcotics, while not a serious problem today, could increase in popularity.

International narcotics traffickers utilize well-developed transportation networks in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The openness of borders and the paucity of counternarcotics personnel in each of the countries will enable international drug traffickers to deliver heroin produced in South Asia to markets in developed countries throughout the world.

The border region of Burma, Laos, and Thailand, known as the Golden Triangle, is a notorious illicit drug production and processing corridor. Burma is one of the world's largest producers and exporters of opium. Most of the opium crop is cultivated in the Golden Triangle, an area largely beyond the control of national governments and rife with ethnic conflicts. Since the United States cut off aid in 1988, the Burmese government has suspended its anti-drug programs and seems to have made arrangements with drug trafficking groups to cease hostilities and share drug revenues.

In contrast, Laos and Thailand have attempted to cooperate with the United States in efforts to fight drug trafficking. But these efforts have so far failed to curb production or distribution of drugs. An additional obstacle to progress is the complicity of local military, police and civilian officials in drug trafficking.

Other parts of Asia have largely been spared drug-associated problems or have found other ways to control them. ASEAN countries, for example, have enacted some of the world's harshest measures to combat drug abuse and trafficking. In Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia executions are not uncommon for conviction of possession of



relatively small amounts of narcotics. In Japan drug abuse is cause for concern, even though its incidence is minor compared to the United States and other Western countries.

#### **NATURAL/MANMADE DISASTERS AND THE ENVIRONMENT**

Asia's geography and climate can be divided into three zones: forests, deserts, and mountains. Natural disasters in the form of typhoons, droughts and famine, flooding, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions commonly occur in the various zones. For example, the Mekong River flows through six countries: Tibet, Laos, Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia. In August 1991, the river flooded the area around Phnom Penh and caused more than \$150 million in damage.

**Table 2. Recent Natural Disasters (Asia-Pacific Region)**

SAMPLER OF ASIA-PACIFIC NATURAL DISASTERS			
Disaster	Date	Location	Damage
Floods	8/1991	Cambodia	\$150 million
Volcano	6/1991	Philippines	\$1 billion
Typhoon	5/1991	Bangladesh	50,000 lives
Earthquake	7/1990	Philippines	\$750 million

Sources: The Economist, 1991, and Far Eastern Economic Review's Asia 1991, pp. 198-200.

In addition to the flooding in Cambodia, two major natural disasters struck Asia in 1991: a killer typhoon on the coast of Bangladesh and a volcanic eruption in the Philippines. In May a fierce typhoon devastated impoverished coastal regions of Bangladesh and claimed more than 50,000 lives. In a new role, U.S. marines performed rescue missions and provided assistance to victims and their families. Even without unfavorable global climatic changes to exacerbate flooding, the Asian-Pacific region will continue to experience cycles of destructive typhoons, tsunami (tidal waves), earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions. If global warming continues and sea levels rise as some predict, Asia and the Pacific will be among the most vulnerable regions of the world, and the number of potential victims in low-lying and island communities will increase dramatically.

Natural and political forces in the Philippines teamed up to jeopardize a nearly century-long U.S. military presence in the archipelago in 1991. In June Mt. Pinatubo on Luzon erupted with a blast that compelled U.S. forces to abandon Clark Air Base. In

September the Philippines Senate voted against renewing the U.S.-Philippines leasing agreement for Subic Bay Naval Base. This action will necessitate transferring naval assets to other Pacific bases (e.g., Guam), redeploying them to other areas of operation, or decommissioning them.

Environmental concerns are also raised by development of nuclear power programs. Lacking adequate domestic energy resources, Japan has cautiously developed a substantial nuclear power program. However, local resistance is mounting to new facilities, especially the Rokkasho nuclear fuel reprocessing plant, slated to receive reprocessed fuel and extracts of plutonium and uranium. A future mission for the Self-Defense Forces could be escorting reprocessed fuels from Europe to Japan by sea. Such cargo would be a prime target for terrorist groups and in a worst case scenario might lead to various low-intensity conflict scenarios.

Meanwhile, the relationship between nuclear arms and the environment is brought into focus by continued French testing of nuclear weapons in Polynesia. In the medium or long-term the Pacific or large portions of the region will likely become a "nuclear-weapons free zone," which will change U.S. naval deployment policies and strategies.

In much of poverty-stricken Asia, the primitive infrastructure (roads, communication and warning systems, and bridges), overpopulation, and inadequate health care services exacerbate an already catastrophic situation in terms of lives lost and property damage.

In the forecast period, Pacific-based U.S. military forces, especially those with amphibious capabilities, may expect to perform missions similar to those executed by the marines in the Bay of Bengal. These missions may be specifically assigned or may arise as humanitarian missions of opportunity. Overall, in the coming decades degradation of the Pacific marine and atoll environment (e.g., drift net fishing, nuclear testing, oil spills, and deforestation) may be severe enough to warrant the deployment of U.S. naval forces as "green" brigades or patrols.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

Prospective missions for the United States Marine Corps in the Asia-Pacific region over the next thirty years may include: expanding security and protection for U.S. citizens and diplomats in new nation-states; short-term peace-time operations, such as the delivery of food and medical supplies to the victims of the natural disasters; and military support for traditional allied national governments to deter or overcome the effects of a nuclear

attack, suppress an insurgency, conduct counterterrorist operations, or interdict the transportation of illegal narcotics.

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

Scale 1:33,000,000  
0 250 500 Kilometers  
0 250 500 Nautical Miles  
Mercator Projection

## **THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE POST COLD-WAR WORLD: MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHWEST ASIA**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Analysis of the future Middle Eastern and Southwest Asian security environment requires consideration of a complex range of geopolitical, economic, technological, military and environmental factors, as well as demographic factors and unplanned events such as natural disasters (or planned catastrophes).

### **GEOPOLITICAL**

The Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 and the collapse of communist governments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have had a major impact on geopolitical developments in the Middle East. The Gulf Crisis has exacerbated and speeded some trends already underway. It has led to new regional political and security alliances. The most powerful of these is led by the United States and includes Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf states, Egypt, Syria, Turkey and, indirectly, Israel. Jordan plays a role in this alliance, particularly on Arab-Israeli issues. This alliance was formed to deter future aggression in the region, specifically by Iraq (now considerably weakened militarily, but resuming its ambitious military program), with Iran also viewed as a potential future challenger. Iran is expected to emerge as the most potent military force in the Gulf region, and may supplant Iraq. The recent purchase by Libya of a new intermediate-range ballistic missile system (IRBM) from North Korea is also of concern to this alliance.

Furthermore, Middle Eastern and Southwest Asian governments are making major foreign policy reassessments as a result of the collapse of communism. Reduced Soviet and Eastern European support to past Middle Eastern clients such as Syria and Iraq also affects the regional balance.

Regionally, prospects for Arab-Israeli peace have improved, although problems remain at the local level. Internationally, peace prospects have been enhanced by the following factors: the end of the Cold War and worldwide Soviet military disengagement; restoration of Soviet-Israeli ties and massive immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel; reestablishment of Soviet-Saudi relations; and reduced Soviet military assistance to Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). On the local level, however, Israel's Likud government steadfastly refuses to deal directly with the PLO or to agree to exchange land

in the occupied territories for peace. Nevertheless, this hardline position will change within the next five years, even if the Likud remains in power.

The United States is now the preeminent superpower in the region. As a result of its dominant role in the Gulf War, the United States is expected to provide long-term security and military assistance to the Gulf states, as well as pre-positioned military equipment in the region. The first military accord between the United States and a Gulf state since the end of the Gulf War was the ten-year security pact reached in September 1991 between the United States and Kuwait. Under the terms of the accord, the U.S. military will pre-position stockpiles of equipment in Kuwait and conduct periodic exercises and joint training with Kuwaiti forces.

Middle Eastern political systems will be radically transformed in the long-term, although current ideological patterns will not change. Thus, nationalism or national interest will continue to motivate a country's foreign policy, despite endorsement of pan-Arabism or pan-Islamism. Islam, however, will remain dominant in the Arab Middle East and Iran. More attention will be paid to the issue of human rights in individual countries in the future.

Instability will be driven by greater fragmentation within virtually all Middle Eastern societies and by the disruptive socio-economic effects of the Gulf War, particularly the reduction in labor migration to the oil-rich Gulf states and the concomitant drop in remittances that have placed great strains on Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Yemen, and Egypt, particularly. This situation may lead to the emergence of groups advocating radical change and to increased terrorism in the short- and mid-terms.

Border disputes between states are expected to lead to greater regional instability in the short-term and mid-terms. Disputed boundaries continue to provoke tensions between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Syria, Lebanon and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Jordan, Israel and the Palestinians, and Morocco and the Polisario Front.

Lebanon, a country driven by ethnic and religious rivalries, is expected to regain some semblance of central government control in the near future, in part because of the consolidation of Syrian hegemony over Lebanon. Political instability for the next five years will remain as a result of disagreements about power-sharing and constitutional framework among factions. The large Shi'a community, although politically split along pro-Syrian and pro-Iranian lines, is likely to play a greater governmental role than previously. Meanwhile,

short-term instability will be caused by the resistance of Maronite and Sunni communities to the prospect of losing their traditional power bases in the government and the army. If United States and Western citizens continue to be taken hostage by local terrorist groups, U.S. military intervention in Lebanon will become necessary.

In Israel proper (within the pre-1967 war Green Line), prospects for electoral reform (i.e., direct election of the prime minister and direct election of parliament members by local constituencies) are unlikely for the next five years. The next parliamentary elections are scheduled for mid-1992.

Substantial progress, however, will be made on the Palestinian/Arab-Israeli peace front in the early 1990s. Israel will recognize it cannot absorb the numerous Palestinians of the West Bank (as well as the substantial Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip without granting them full democratic rights in the Israeli political system. Because granting them such rights would transform Israel into a binational state that no longer had its Jewish character, it will have no choice but to relinquish most of the occupied territories captured in the 1967 June war. Early provisions for Palestinian autonomy should take effect in the mid- to late 1990s, leading in the mid-term to full Palestinian statehood in much of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The achievement of Palestinian statehood will also be due to the change in PLO leadership. By the mid-term, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat as well as leaders of other PLO factions will be replaced by a younger and politically more moderate generation of Palestinian leaders.

The establishment of the Palestinian state will not be a smooth process in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. First, the new state will be overcrowded with returning Palestinian refugees causing social and economic dislocations. Second, the PLO will have to transform itself from a revolutionary movement to a government tasked with administration. Third, neighboring Israel also will be overcrowded as a result of not only the massive influx of Soviet immigrants and their settlement in Israel, but with resettling some 50,000-100,000 Israelis who will be relocating from the West Bank to Israel.

The new state of Palestine will result from protracted negotiations; and although smaller than earlier PLO expectations, it will have a democratic constitution and economic and transportation links with neighboring Jordan and Egypt.

Other changes will impact heavily on contemporary regime types. In the short-term, traditional rulers, particularly in the Gulf region, will resist fundamental change in the socio-political system. Traditional regimes while fostering modernization in areas such as health, education, and communication will continue to maintain control over the society in the short-term. The professional and middle classes are expected to play an increasingly important role in the Gulf principalities, however, and in the mid- and long-terms, traditional ruling families will face increasing pressure to accommodate leaders representing popular will.

In the Gulf principalities, constitutional monarchy, with limited parliamentary democracy, will remain prevalent in 1996. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) will be strengthened, with a NATO-like security pact established. The GCC states will accelerate their purchase of U.S. military materiel and create a GCC peacekeeping force. The six Gulf states, all with substantial Shia minorities, will improve their relations with Iran, although the threat of Iranian intervention will remain. Kuwait will begin to retrench, and its population will decrease and consist of a greater proportion of native Kuwaitis.

Constitutional changes will begin radically to alter regimes in the mid-term. In monarchical Morocco, should King Hassan die or be overthrown, an Islamic regime is likely given the strong Islamic character of the country's opposition. In Jordan, Islamic parties will play a prominent role in parliament and certain government ministries in the next five years. The monarchy will continue and control the armed forces. In the mid- and long-terms, however, Hashemite domination over Jordan will decline, especially once the issue of succession to King Hussein arises and Islamic and Palestinian groups seek to govern.

In republics, previously uncontested dominant parties are expected to lose some of their power by 1996. One-party states such as Syria and Iraq will see movement toward greater political and economic liberalization. Islamic opposition movements will gain significantly in Tunisia, at the expense of the governing socialist Destour Party. The FMLN in Algeria is expected to lose upcoming elections. Private sector activity in formerly state socialist economies such as Syria and Algeria will expand.

Egypt will continue to be governed by the dominant National Democratic party, although Islamic opposition movements are likely to gain in political strength and to make inroads in the country's economy.



In the mid- to late 1990s, Iraq is likely to be dismembered along religious and ethnic lines. Autonomous regions will be taken over by the majority Shia community in the south, a Kurdish province will be located in the north, and the minority Sunni Arabs (who dominate the current Iraqi government) will be concentrated in the central urban centers. Iran is likely to exert influence in Iraq's Shia region. In Iran, the Shia clergy is likely to retain its dominance over all aspects of government and society, with technocrats playing subordinate administrative roles. Foreign policy will be more Western-oriented than in the 1980s, with Europe and the United States gaining greater penetration of Iranian markets.

By 2006, in addition to the establishment of a Palestinian state in much of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, another major political development can be expected: the integration of the region into a Middle East Common Market along the lines of the European Economic Community (EEC).

By 2021, a democratic form of government with a strong Islamic component will characterize much of the Middle East, with Israel retaining its Jewish character.

The transformation of Middle Eastern regimes will also be caused by revolutionary developments brought on by the worldwide spread of information, telephones, television, satellites, short-wave radios, fax machines, and computer modems, as well as other technological breakthroughs.

## **TERRORISM**

Middle Eastern terrorism will change radically over the next three decades. The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is already affecting Middle Eastern terrorist groups and their regional state sponsors through the loss of military assistance, training, logistical help, and safe haven.

The rise of democratic forces in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Nicaragua, and reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Israel by these governments, has placed great pressure on communist sponsored terrorist organizations to moderate their tactics. The participation of Soviet and East European governments in Interpol and their becoming signatories to international antiterrorism treaties has also affected terrorist groups.

In the short-term, these changes will produce increased anarchy among terrorist groups. Gradually, however, some terrorist groups will cease to engage in armed warfare. This will be especially the case once substantial progress is made on Arab-Israeli peace, with the PLO under intense pressure to transform itself from armed struggle to diplomacy.

Bitterly opposed to this trend, rejectionist non-PLO terrorist organizations, such as the Abu Nidal Organization, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, will expand greatly their terrorist operations in the next decade.

Pro-Iraqi terrorism did not materialize following the Coalition's military defeat of Iraq in 1991. However, this does not imply a diminution of the terrorist threat. In fact, in the future terrorist threats may be more difficult to predict because the groups will become cellular in nature, making them difficult to identify. In the short- and mid-terms, these groups will engage in terrorist activity after careful planning and target selection that will be even more lethal than before.

Terrorist groups, such as the pro-Iranian Hizballah, never linked to the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, and primarily religious in their orientation, will continue terrorist activities. Islamic terrorist groups will be especially active in Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. State sponsorship of terrorism, primarily by Iraq, Libya, and Iran, will continue in the next five years, although regime changes in these countries in the next 15 and 30 years may end these activities.

#### **PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION**

The threat of Middle East nuclear proliferation is a continual risk to United States interests and exacerbates tensions in the region. Whereas the United States has urged special restraint by nuclear suppliers offering assistance to civil nuclear projects, nations such as China have ignored this injunction.

Fifteen Middle East nations have signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Israel and several Arab states, as well as Iran, still refuse adherence.

Nuclear proliferation is thus one of the most dangerous long-term military trends in the Middle East. Israel will remain the region's dominant nuclear power. Iraq, although a party to the NPT, has actively sought to build nuclear weapons and has clandestinely continued this pursuit following its military defeat in the Gulf War. By 1995 Iraq will probably have acquired a nuclear weapons production capability. Libya wishes to develop a nuclear capability but so far has directed its efforts toward helping Pakistan to develop an "Islamic bomb." Iran also seeks to develop nuclear weapons but despite nuclear reactors under construction is far from its goal. Algeria's nuclear reactor program may enable it to build a bomb by the mid-1990s.

Middle Eastern military forces are preparing for future wars. They are emphasizing ballistic missiles, antiballistic defense systems, as well as more traditional tanks, artillery, mobile infantry, and command-control-communications and intelligence (C3I) systems. Israel will continue to assert its qualitative edge over Arab armies in these areas. Israeli arms requirements will stress purchasing aircraft from abroad and concentrating on cutting-edge weapons, and defense and communications systems, including avionics. Israeli military industries are expected to concentrate on upgrading Israeli fighters aircraft and helicopters, and developing the next generation mini-Remote Piloted Vehicle (RPV) drone. The main weapons system Israel is developing is the Arrow Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM) project, part of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The ATBM is slated to become operational in 1995. Israel is also developing its own early warning intelligence satellite.

With the changes in the former Soviet bloc, the United States will draw an increasing number of Arab states into its orbit through arms sales. Substantial amounts of U.S. materiel will be pre-positioned in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Israel. Western Europe, particularly Britain and France, will be major arms exporters. Britain and France will sell large amounts of arms to Iran (despite continued Western friction with Tehran), and Eastern Europe, particularly Czechoslovakia and Poland, will sell refurbished Soviet military equipment to the Middle East. The "gray" arms trade is expected to expand, as radical Middle Eastern governments seek arms unobtainable from either the United States or the Soviet Union. China, North Korea, South Africa, and Brazil, and Chile's Cardoen Industries are expected to fill this void.

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the Gulf states will greatly expand their standing armies, especially by instituting conscription. Their standing armies will also reduce the proportion of "foreign" nationals.

Prospects for a Middle East arms control regime (ACR) for the short-term are unlikely; a long-term ACR paralleling political/diplomatic progress is possible.

### **ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS**

Middle Eastern economies are expected to change radically within the next three decades. These changes began prior to the 1991 Gulf War, but the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has sped the transformation. First, labor patterns will change drastically in the Gulf states, with profound repercussions for other Arab countries. This step has already

been incorporated into the next five-year development plans of Gulf states: more nationals will be employed in all facets of the economy and less dependence will be placed on foreign workers. While strengthening Gulf industry and infrastructural development, this shift will severely damage the economies of Arab countries that formerly supplied labor on a large scale. Such countries include Jordan (including Palestinians), Yemen, and Egypt, which relied heavily on expatriate remittances. Similarly, any European move to reduce the number of expatriate laborers from North Africa will place severe strains on Maghreb economies. Thus, growing unemployment is foreseen for much of the non-oil producing Middle Eastern states.

A second change will be an exodus of mostly secular educated workers and professionals from the Middle East to Europe and North America, resulting from political uncertainty and unrest in the region brought on by the likely electoral victories of Islamic parties.

Third, moves toward economic liberalization as well as economic austerity measures will likely result in higher unemployment, especially as governments divest themselves of state-owned enterprises or reduce bloated government bureaucracies. Labor unrest will increase.

Fourth, the Gulf War caused an estimated \$150-\$200 billion in damages, and the costs of rebuilding Iraq and Kuwait are expected to outstrip financial resources at hand. Iraq also faces reparation demands from Kuwait and Iran (which has not recovered from its eight-year war with Iraq). The international embargo on Iraq will continue until Saddam Hussein is removed or overthrown. Even Saudi Arabia faces financial burdens and prior to the Gulf War faced an \$8-\$10 billion annual deficit for the previous two or three years. Considerable funds will be needed to rebuild Gulf military forces, including Iraq and Iran.

OPEC will increase its share of the world oil market, and therefore Gulf oil will remain a major security concern for the United States and Europe. Oil-rich Gulf states are already planning for the long-term, and many are diversifying their economies by developing more than one outlet for industry or exports.

Fifth, a drastic reduction in foreign economic assistance by oil-rich Gulf states is likely.

Sixth, most Middle Eastern states will be entering the 1990s heavily in debt. Thus, economic and political instability will increase as countries find it increasingly difficult to service their large external debt.

Seventh, high technology will continue to be the most important sector in the Israeli economy, particularly in defense industries. Just as many Western and Soviet defense industries are currently shifting from military to civilian consumer products, Israel's military industries are increasingly diversifying to civilian product lines. An additional change will be that even for Ministry of Defence military industries success in the international market will determine likelihood for corporate survival, as opposed to the previous practice of heavy subsidies for failing government corporations.

### **NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING**

In the next thirty years, the Middle Eastern drug trade centering on heroin, opium, and hashish is expected to flourish. An increase in areas under poppy cultivation is projected for the short- and mid-terms. This increase will have severe mid- and long-term repercussions on Middle Eastern governments and societies. Several Middle Eastern governments, particularly Lebanon and Syria, will find it increasingly difficult to disengage themselves from the immense profits garnered through drug trafficking in the short- and mid-terms. Other governments opposed to drug trafficking are having difficulty controlling these activities in their own countries. On the societal level, the number of drug addicts in many Middle Eastern countries will increase in the short- and mid-terms.

Despite some improvement in counteraction by many Middle Eastern states against growers, traffickers and insurgents linked to the drug trade, major problems remain. These include the capacity of governments to pursue criminal cartels and trafficking organizations, the ability to put pressure on growers to abandon crop production, and the ability to provide them with incentives and alternatives. A full-scale effort involves anti-corruption campaigns as well as the reform of judicial systems to ensure that weak judiciaries do not undermine law enforcement gains. Finally, demand must be reduced.

In the short- and mid-terms, Lebanon will remain the major Middle Eastern illicit narcotics producing and trafficking country. It is a significant producer of hashish and opium, a refiner of heroin, and a major transshipment point for the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf for cocaine from South America. Drugs bring in profits estimated at \$4 billion a year, or about one-half of the country's foreign income. In Lebanon, cultivation of

hashish has continued more or less unhindered since the collapse of the Lebanese government after the 1975 civil war. In 1988, the area of hashish cultivation in Lebanon was about 16,000 hectares (40,000 acres). Syrian occupational forces control all movements in the Biqa Valley, the prime drug-producing region. In 1991 many Lebanese growers shifted from hashish to the cultivation of poppies that produce more profitable morphine, opium, and heroin. The reestablishment in 1991 of central Lebanese government authority will have only a slight impact on drug trafficking. The drug trade is also linked to the international airport in Damascus and bring about \$1 billion a year to Syrian authorities.

Other Middle Eastern countries will remain transshipment points for drug trafficking. These include Cyprus, Israel, Egypt and Libya. Cyprus, which is neither a producer nor a significant consumer of narcotics, is used as a transshipment point for Europe by Lebanese and Turkish traffickers. A small percentage of drugs that reach Israel and Egypt come via an alternative route that runs through south Lebanon. Part of this traffic supplies the internal Israeli market. Beduins smuggle the rest through the Negev Desert to Egypt. Egypt is an important consuming country and an ideal transit point for Asian and Middle Eastern heroin, opium and hashish destined for Western Europe and North America. Most Egyptian narcotics arrive by sea off the northern coast, with hashish entering the country via Libya.

Drug trafficking is a major business in Iran and will increase in the short- and mid-terms. Afghanistan and Pakistan are major drug sources. Iran, which has an estimated 600,000 drug users, recently stepped up its antidrug campaign by ordering specialist forces throughout the country to draft a five-year plan of action. That country has signed a number of bilateral agreements on drug control and the exchange of intelligence on traffickers. Major Iranian trafficking organizations operate out of Istanbul, where together with other international groups they make connections with Iran and Pakistan, as well as Europe, the United States and Canada.

#### **ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS**

The Middle East will face various environmental crises in the next three decades. A major problem is shortage of water. The arid Middle East region has only a few and relatively small rivers. Severe drought in the region has reduced water levels in rivers and lakes. A temperature increase of 1.5 degrees centigrade and a sea level rise of 20 cm are

expected to take place in the region by 2025. The rise in sea level will cause salinization of fresh water aquifers as well as damage farmlands below sea level. Higher temperatures and dwindling water supplies will accelerate desertification.

Unless effective water-related diplomacy and water management arrangements between riparian states are undertaken, shortages will be so severe that water will be as important a regional resource in the next three decades as oil is today. A further complication is the region's population growth; the population in the Arab states is expected to double within the next 23 years. Israel's population, facing an unprecedented immigration from the Soviet Union (up to one million Soviet Jews are expected to immigrate by 1994), will increase 25 percent in the next five years. Israel is highly dependent on four aquifers in the occupied West Bank; its already precarious water situation will be considerably worse when a Palestinian state is created and claims those aquifers. By the beginning of the 21st century, the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip will lack sufficient water for domestic or industrial use, let alone agriculture.

Although water is Israel's most pressing environmental concern, it also suffers from relatively high levels of pollution. These include air pollution, problems in disposing toxic and solid wastes, and pollution of some of the country's water supply.

Syria, which is extremely dependent for its water supply on upstream Turkey, where the Euphrates rises, also faces a critical water situation in the next 10 to 15 years if its current population growth rate continues.

Libya is currently engaged in an ambitious scheme to construct a great manmade river project, and its pumping program will adversely affect Egypt's potential for agricultural development in adjacent regions. Iraq, which receives a significant water supply from Turkey, is vulnerable to the "water weapon" considered by U.S. military planners during the Gulf War: the turning off of Iraq's water supply from Turkey.

In the long-term, considerable thought is being given to a major \$17 billion project, named the "Peace Pipeline," to bring water from southeastern Turkey to the shores of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. If regional conflicts are not resolved, however, this pipeline would be subject to potential sabotage.

Planned environmental catastrophes are another potential problem. They have already occurred in the Middle East as a result of Iraq's deliberate burning of Kuwait's oil wells in February 1991. An increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide from the fires will

cause some global warming and lower food production. In the immediate region of the oil fires, the initial effects of the oil well fires were a decrease in sunlight and temperature, as well as soot-laden rain that was deposited over a large part of the region, including areas in Iraq. Pollutants at the ground level will have severe long-term health effects on the population of Kuwait City. The environmental impact is also severe in countries downwind. Unburned oil droplets, soot deposits, and highly acidic rain will affect crops, animals, and water reservoirs. Photochemical smog will occur in regions farther from the fires.

The deliberate Iraqi spill of Kuwaiti oil into the Persian Gulf will also have a severe effect on marine life. The spilled oil has already severely damaged about 60 kilometers of the Saudi coastline, and reduced fish and waterfowl stocks, as well as seagrass on the coast of Kuwait. The environmental damage to the Gulf will reach the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean in the long-term.

Earthquakes also cause environmental damage. In Iran, which experiences occasional earthquakes, the two most recent earthquakes occurred in September 1978 and June 1990. Both caused severe loss of life, extensive damage to property, and disruption of communications. Jerusalem also suffers minor earthquakes from time to time and earth tremors are also frequent along the Jordan Valley.

In Iraq, poorly managed flood waters also cause problems. For example, the Tigris River is liable to sudden flooding and regularly inundates immense areas, particularly in the spring.



This is a detailed black and white map of Africa and the surrounding regions, including Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The map shows national borders, major cities, and geographical features like the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. A scale bar at the bottom left indicates 1:48,000,000, and a note at the bottom right states "Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative".

**Geographical Features and Regions:**

- Oceans and Seas:** North Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Guinea, South Atlantic Ocean, Indian Ocean.
- Continents and Major Regions:** Europe (Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, etc.), Africa (Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, etc.), Asia (Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, etc.), and the Middle East.
- Major Cities:** Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, Cairo, Khartoum, Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Johannesburg, Cape Town, etc.
- Geographical Markers:** Strait of Gibraltar, Tropic of Cancer, Tropic of Capricorn, Equator, Azores (PORT.), Madeira Is. (PORT.), Canary Is. (SP.), etc.

**Scale and Projection:**

- Scale: 1:48,000,000
- Scale bar: 0 to 1000 Kilometers and 0 to 1000 Nautical Miles.
- Projection: Azimuthal Equal-Area Projection.

**Boundary Representation:**

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

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## **THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE POST COLD-WAR WORLD: AFRICA**

### **INTRODUCTION**

In the long-term, the countries of sub-Saharan Africa will continue to experience severe developmental problems in all sectors of society. Economically Africa will be the world's poorest continent. While there will be isolated local successes, particularly in South Africa and Kenya, the problems of much of the continent will get worse in the short- and mid-terms. The problems will be caused by crumbling colonial-era infrastructures, AIDS and other fatal diseases, widespread environmental problems (desertification, deforestation, water shortages and water pollution, and soil erosion), and militant tribal and ethnic nationalist movements. Much of the continent will continue to be highly dependent on massive foreign assistance, particularly economic and humanitarian aid. There will be greater moves toward political liberalization, although few political systems will be truly democratic. In many cases, military dictatorships and single-party governments will prevail. Military coups will remain the case in Nigeria, for example, where the military intervened more than six times between 1966 and 1985.

In spite of the continent's severe economic problems, defense expenditures will increase in the future. The military, one of the strongest institutions in post-colonial Africa, will therefore continue to be the dominant force in society. Border and ethnic disputes between African countries will continue to drive inter-state conflict. Foreign military intervention to assist troubled nations may be required in the short- and mid-term periods.

### **POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND ALLIANCES**

The drive toward political reforms and democratization will continue in the short-, mid-, and long-term. In the short-term, the movement from one party-governments to multiparty democracy will persist. In Zaire, for example, multiparty elections will take place in 1992. The former communist regimes of Angola and Mozambique will also hold multiparty elections in the early 1990s. In Nigeria, a political transition program initiated by the military regime of President Ibrahim Babangida, underway since 1985, will conclude with two-party presidential elections in 1992. Zaire will introduce multi-party elections in the short-term. Although many one-party regimes are slowly yielding to democracy, several sub-Saharan African governments will remain under the rule of single parties.

In the short- and mid-term, the major development in the continent will be political changes in post-apartheid South Africa, where the transition to nonracial democracy will hold. Social dislocations will be prevalent in the short-term, as right-wing white militants resist giving up power and communal, tribal, and ethnic conflicts among the majority black population persist or intensify. There is a possibility that several black homelands in South Africa will secede and declare independence.

Throughout the continent, in the short-term, the drive toward democratic rule will be hampered by economic problems, tribal and ethnic conflicts, and internal wars. The prevalence of the armed forces in society and periodic intervention by the military during crisis situations will make full democratization difficult to achieve.

Foreign powers, especially the United States, may deploy military forces to monitor elections in several African countries in the short-term. Local political and military crises may compel U.S. forces to evacuate U.S. citizens and foreign personnel from countries in turmoil, as Belgium did in September 1991 in Zaire.

In the short- and mid-term, new political systems in sub-Saharan Africa may not differ much from prevailing governments. There will be some electoral and constitutional reforms, although in the short-term, many of these reform will not be well defined and will be primarily concerned with removing incumbent governments from power.

Thus, the prospect for democracy for the region is likely to remain uncertain and tenuous for the short- and mid-term. Nevertheless, radical changes in the political environment will characterize the long-term, with governments becoming more accountable to popular mandate.

Border disputes and ethnic and tribal rivalries will result in the creation of additional nation-states in the mid- and long-terms. Having achieved a quasi-state of independence from Ethiopia, Eritria will become an independent country in the mid-term.

## **CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

In the short-term, interstate warfare will prevail, as it did in the 1980s, when nine countries (Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Rwanda, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda), some 150 million people or about 27 percent of the continent's population, and about one third of the continent's land area suffered debilitating warfare. Large population groups were uprooted, with millions of refugees scattered across territorial borders. Such inter-state warfare will have severe short- and mid-term consequences for the continent.

War has made economic development largely impossible within the afflicted African countries. It has disrupted education and health care systems. In disrupting trade and transportation, war has slowed growth over entire regions.

In the short-term, civil wars in Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Mozambique, and Sudan will continue. In Mozambique resolution of the internal struggle between the government and RENAMO will occur in the short-term, especially following the withdrawal of Soviet and South African military support to the contending sides.

At the same time, progress in the short-term toward resolution of civil wars will be achieved in Uganda. Similarly, Ethiopia will experience a measure of peace in the short-term, although the country's geographically diverse Eritrean and Tigre armed factions must still reconcile their differences. As a result of the holding of democratic elections, Angola will also have a measure of peace in the short-term.

The end of the Cold War means an almost total Soviet disengagement from the continent. The U.S. response is unclear at this time. To fill the void left by the departing superpowers, lesser powers such as China, Britain, France, Libya, North Korea, Israel and South Africa will become more active in the short- and mid-term. Israel may play a role in Ethiopia, Kenya and Zaire. The Libyan role, particularly in the form of subversion and support of opposition movements, will be highly threatening to existing regimes.

Nigeria and South Africa will maintain their position as the major regional powers in sub-Saharan Africa in the short-term. Nigeria's economic and military clout will be especially prevalent in West Africa and ECOWAS. Post-apartheid South Africa, although concerned primarily with its own reconstruction effort, will increase its economic and military roles in neighboring states, including the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

#### **MILITARY TRENDS**

In the short-term, there will be an increase in defense expenditures for the sub-Saharan African region, led by South Africa and Nigeria. Internal instability will result in large amounts of defense expenditures on counterinsurgency training and equipment.

In the near term, South Africa will continue to rely on locally manufactured arms for its military requirements. With the ending of the United Nations embargo in the short-term, South Africa will purchase much of its arms from the United States, Europe, Israel, Chile and Brazil. Its future military needs will include advanced fighter aircraft (based on

the canceled Israeli Lavi project), helicopters, transport and reconnaissance aircraft, diesel submarines, warships, ballistic missiles, and counterinsurgency equipment. In the short term, South Africa will obtain an intermediate-range ballistic missile, probably based on the Israeli Jericho-II.

South Africa will remain the continent's primary nuclear power, with the technological capability to produce atomic weapons and tactical delivery systems. In post-apartheid South Africa, however, there will be troubling questions over the new majority black government's role in the nuclear sphere.

No other African country will possess a nuclear capability, although some countries will stock chemical and biological weapons. Ballistic missiles, supplied by countries such as North Korea and China, will be a part of the arsenals of several sub-Saharan African countries.

The South African satellite program, with military applications, will expand in the short- and mid-term.

#### **ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

Economic underdevelopment will continue to mark sub-Saharan countries. The performance of the African economies during 1986-1990 remained highly unsatisfactory; and this trend will continue. In the short-term, real gross domestic product (GDP) will grow by an average of 1.5 to 2.3 percent annually. Agricultural output will not keep pace with population growth and food dependency will increase. Famine and malnutrition, an image of the continent, will continue to threaten large segments of the population in many countries.

In the short-term, exports will improve somewhat, but will be counterbalanced by low prices for most non-oil commodities. A deterioration in the annual trade balance is expected.

Living standards will worsen considerably in the next five years, particularly in areas such as education, health, nutrition, and employment.

The crisis in economic development will continue, resulting from outdated infrastructure, including inefficient lines of communication; ineffective planning and management, overprotective economic policies, such as overvalued exchange rates; quantitative trade restrictions and price controls, which have discriminated against agricultural production and the export sector. The excessive size of government in most African states is also a

liability. More efficient use of resources, trade liberalization, and cuts in public spending will be needed to make Africa more competitive in the international market and to provide the necessary incentives for production, especially in the agricultural sector.

### **ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS**

Sub-Saharan Africa's annual population growth rate of 3 percent will remain the highest in the world in the short- and mid-terms. The population will more than double by 2025, from 648 million in 1990 to 1.6 billion in 2025. Family planning, education, and services will be the continent's primary concern in the short- and mid-terms. Attention to such concerns will be the only way to develop economically and raise living standards; otherwise, the continent will be overwhelmed by overpopulation. Pollution is a major environmental problem affecting living standards, and hazardous toxic waste is just one of the many problems in many countries.

Weather conditions, droughts, deforestation, and the persistence of civil wars will result in greater food shortages and famine in the short- and mid-terms. Over twenty million people are already affected by famine. This is the case in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, and other West African countries. Civil strife in these countries will continue to displace people and severely curtail the distribution of emergency food aid and other relief supplies. In the near term, the end of the civil war in Ethiopia, as well as the signing of a peace accord between the government and insurgent forces in Angola, will restart food and rehabilitation programs in those countries, although supply and distribution problems will remain. Here the U.S. armed forces may assume a new role by expanding their assistance from simple delivery of food and medical equipment to actual distribution, as in Iraq in 1991.

As always, any short-term solution to sub-Saharan Africa's food problem must, to a significant degree, be political. Political settlements of Africa's internal wars and the creation of stable political systems, as well as a higher level of competence in government, will contribute to easing food shortages on the continent. Also, there must be an increase in agricultural production, with food distribution getting a higher priority in development strategies and plans.

Water shortages and water pollution pose severe environmental threats to much of sub-Saharan Africa. There is a potential for the drying up of some of the continent's major

lakes, including Lake Victoria in Uganda and Lake Chad. The reduced Nile flow will affect Ethiopia and Sudan.

The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), which causes AIDS, will continue to pose serious threats to the development of human resources in Africa. By early 1991 about 6 million persons were infected with HIV on the continent (more than half the global total). About 3 million women are infected, and the incidence of HIV infection appears to be increasing. Moreover, as of early 1990, about 900,000 HIV-infected infants were born in sub-Saharan Africa; and during the 1990s several million more are expected. An increasing number of "AIDS orphans" will be left without family or community support after parents and relatives die of the disease. What is most threatening about the AIDS epidemic is that it attacks the economically active age groups, mainly in cities and towns, but also among rural populations. Other diseases are causing even greater losses. An illness such as diarrhea, a nuisance in the developed world, claims thousands of victims in Africa.

Concern for the security and preservation of African wildlife will intensify around the world. Foreign military assistance may be required to train anti-poaching teams in Kenya and elsewhere in East Africa to ensure the survival of the great animals: the elephant, giraffe, and rhinoceros.

The United States may be asked to provide disaster relief and humanitarian assistance to Africa to minimize the victims and losses from famine, floods, and other natural disasters.

#### **DRUG TRAFFICKING**

Drug trafficking and substance abuse are spreading rapidly in sub-Saharan Africa, presenting short- and mid-term threats. Heroin and cocaine first appeared on the continent in the early 1980s, but increasing numbers of Africans are being arrested for trafficking, with some penetrating the Asian, Western European and North American markets. Morocco will remain a transit country for cocaine, with other routes in Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia. Cocaine problems will persist in Cameroon, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Rwanda, and countries in the southern subregion.

#### **TERRORISM**

The prevalence of political instability is likely to cause an increase in terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa. In 1990, there were 52 terrorist incidents on the continent, a slight increase over 1989. This rate will persist. Most acts of terrorism will continue to be

carried out by local insurgents. Most terrorist acts will be domestic in nature, in the context of struggles against governments.

With the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa, there will be a marked reduction in violent incidents by the government and by the majority black population in the short-term. Within each community, however, terrorism along factional or tribal lines may increase.



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